摘要：朱熹哲学是基于“理”这一根源性概念的一元论形而上学体系。本文主要讨论朱熹哲学的理一元论体系建构中的本体论问题，如理气先后、理一分殊、理气动静、心与理一等。从这些哲学基本问题的入手，梳理朱熹对于形而上学体系的建构过程，澄清哲学论证的理论逻辑，同时在这一过程之中主要依靠概念范畴的分析和演绎方法，以澄清朱熹哲学中的基本概念内涵以及概念之间的相互关系。
本文认为，朱熹哲学之中的概念和命题体现出了辩证的思想。“理”作为朱熹哲学体系的最高本体论范畴，其概念自身并非是一个抽象的、孤立的、静态的界定，而是具有丰富的展开面向。朱熹哲学体系之中的其他概念，均是从“理”这一根源性概念的自身展开过程之中过渡而来。所谓“辩证”正是指概念出于自身必然性而转化的过程。“理”这一概念中的辩证逻辑使得朱熹哲学体系中的基本形而上学问题均具有辩证的内核。
因此，本文将朱熹哲学与黑格尔哲学在辩证法的视域之中进行比较。黑格尔哲学同样是一种一元论的形而上学体系，其最高的概念“精神”是一个自身转变的、自身创造的概念，它不断在自身之内建立他者并且通过这一他者作为中介性的映现从而折返回到自身之中。因而，在黑格尔哲学之中，概念自身建立了自身的环节，诸环节之间同样具有一个辩证的、相互蕴含、相互过渡的关系。在朱熹哲学的形而上学体系的建构之中出现的基本问题，与黑格尔哲学之中的基本问题具有相似之处，例如有与无、同一与差异、本质与存在、实体与主体之间的关系等等。本文所使用的论述方法，是在分别澄清二者对于哲学问题的论述基础上，试图借助黑格尔的理论视域重新诠释朱熹哲学之中的哲学内核，同时在这一诠释之中揭示出黑格尔哲学与朱熹哲学的内在本质差异，并且进一步通过这一比较哲学的工作，以开启对于二者作为形而上学体系的当代创造性诠释。
借助比较哲学的方法和对于辩证精神的理解，本文在第一章之中首先综述了对于朱熹哲学的既有比较哲学研究的成果，并且指出了在这些既有研究成果之中尚且不能完全澄清的理论问题，同时分析了黑格尔哲学的基本框架，并且指出朱熹哲学与黑格尔哲学在何种意义上分享了相似的哲学问题和二者的比较之所以得以可能的基础。在第二章对于“生生之理”的分析中本文指出，理作为使气“生生”的根据，其自身作为形而上者，具有将自身实现、体现为形而下者的本质倾向，这一倾向之所以可能，根本原因在于理自身所具有的自身否定性，同时这种自身否定性与肯定性是统一的，表现为理作为万物的普遍本质和整体秩序在自身之中建立具体事物的规定性的过程。在第三章对于“理一分殊”的分析中本文指出，之所以理就有这种自身否定性，原因在于理自身之中便包含着差别，“理一”与“分理”的差别内在于理自身之中，作为同一性和差异性的统一体，理内在所包含的矛盾推动了理这一概念的展开。理自身之中的内在差别构成了万物之所以具有真正的普遍差异性的根据。理自身就是偶然性与必然性的统一，并且是从可能性朝向现实性的不断过渡和对于全新的可能性的开放性生成。在第四章中本文分析了“理气动静”这一问题所引发的对于朱熹哲学中的理是否具有活动性的争论，并且通过驳斥以牟宗三为代表的对于朱熹哲学的误解，从而澄清在朱熹哲学中理作为本质与存在之统一的涵义。理作为普遍性的本质，其自身就是它的实存，在这个意义上，理自身就体现为万物的大化流行，“即存在即活动”的。在第五章对于“心与理一”的讨论之中，本文将朱熹哲学中“心”与“理”这两个概念与黑格尔论主体与实体之间的关系进行了比较，指出“心”与“理”之间具有本质的同一性，但是这个同一性并非是直接性地作为某种原初开端而被给予，而是需要经过主体的自为行动才能将其实现。这意味着主体和实体都需要经过一个自身转变的过程，最终才能实现主体与实体之间自在自为的统一。这一转变过程的中介就是“格物致知”作为主体的行动，只有通过对有限性的深入才能达到对于普遍的无限本质的实现。
在对于以上命题的分析中，本文指出朱熹哲学是一种理本论的哲学建构。在“理”这一根源性、本质性的最高概念过渡为它自身之内的其他概念的过程中，可以发现内在于“理”之中的自身否定性。这一否定性使得“理”始终具有一个“生生”的生成性和开放性，使得它出于自身的内在必然性的要求而在自身之内去建立自身的规定性，去生成和创造具体的万事万物，从而又在万事万物的实存和秩序的建立之中肯定自身。所以“理”的本质是否定性与肯定性的统一。
关键词：朱熹 天理 黑格尔 辩证法 理念
Abstract：Zhu Xi's philosophy is a monistic metaphysical theory based on the fundamental concept of Li. This article mainly discusses the ontological issues in the construction of the monism system of Zhu Xi's philosophy, such as the order of Li and Qi, the identity and difference of Li, the dynamic of Li and Qi, the unity of the Mind and Li, etc. Starting from these basic ontological problems, this article combs Zhu Xi's construction of metaphysical system, clarifies the theoretical logic of his philosophy argument. The method used in this article mainly relies on the analysis and deductive method of conceptual categories to clarify the basic connotations and the relationship of concepts in Zhu Xi's philosophy.
This article focuses on the dialectical thinking in Zhu Xi's philosophy. As the highest ontological category in Zhu Xi’s metaphyseal system, "Li" is not an abstract, isolated, static concept, but has a rich range of developmental aspects. The other concepts in Zhu Xi's philosophy are all transitioned from the self-development process of Li. The so-called "dialectics" refers to the self-moving process of concept which is out of its own necessity. The dialectical logic in the concept of "Li" makes the basic metaphysical issues in Zhu Xi's philosophy all have a dialectical spirit.
Therefore, this article compares Zhu Xi's philosophy with Hegel's philosophy in the perspective of dialectics. Hegelian philosophy is also a metaphysical system of monism. Its highest concept "spirit" is a self-moving and self-created concept. It constantly establishes the other within itself, mediates itself through its otherness as a reflection and then returns to itself. Therefore, in Hegelian philosophy, the concept itself establishes its own moments, and these moments also have a dialectical, mutual implication and transitional relationship. The basic problems that arise in the construction of the metaphysical system of Zhu Xi’s philosophy are similar to the basic problems in Hegel’s philosophy, such as being and nothing, identity and difference, essence and existence, and the relationship between substance and subject. The philosophical method used in this article is to clarify the two discourses of Hegel and Zhu Xi, to reinterpret the logic of Zhu Xi’s philosophy with the perspective of Hegel’s theoretical horizon, and at the same time reveal the difference between Hegel's and Zhu Xi's philosophy. This work of comparative philosophy hopes to create a new interpretation for both two philosophy.
In Chapter One, this article first summarizes the achievements of comparative philosophical research on Zhu Xi’s philosophy and points out the unclear problems within these existing researches. The first chapter also analyzes the basic framework of Hegel's philosophy, and points out in what sense Zhu Xi's philosophy and Hegel's philosophy share similar philosophical problems and the basis for the comparison between the two. In Chapter Two, this article points out that Li as the ground for making qi create continuously, is a metaphysical concept which has an essential tendency to realize and embody itself in empirical phenomenon. The reason of such tendency lies in the self-negativity of Li. At the same time, self-negativity is the same as positivity, which is manifested as the process of establishing determinations within itself and the universal order of everything. In Chapter Three, through the analysis of "identity and difference of Li", this article points out that the reason why Li is a self-negating concept is that Li contains differences within its identity. Li is the unity of identity and difference and the contradiction within Li promotes the development of itself. The internal differences within Li is the basis for universal differences of things. Li is also the unity of contingency and necessary, and it is a continuous transition from possibility to reality as well as an open generation of completely new possibilities. In Chapter Four, this article discusses the debate on whether Li is activity or not in Zhu Xi’s philosophy, and clarifies Zhu Xi’s definition of Li by refuting Mou Zongsan’s misunderstanding. Li is the unity of essence and existence. As an essence of universality, Li itself is its existence. In this sense, Li manifests itself as the changing process of all things. In Chapter Five, this article analyzes the relation of the Mind and Li in Zhu Xi’s philosophy and compare with Hegel’s argument on the substance and the subject. The Mind and Li is identical in their essence, but this identity is not given directly in the beginning and needs to be realized by the subject's actions. This means that both the subject and the substance need to go through a process of self-negation before they can finally achieve their unity. The intermediary of this self-negating process is the action of "investigation of things". Only by realizing the determination of the finite beings, can we realize the universal infinite essence.
In the analysis of the above propositions, this article points out that Zhu Xi's philosophy is a philosophical construction based on the concept of Li. In the process of the transition from Li to other concepts in Zhu Xi’s theory, we can elaborate the dialectical spirit of self-negativity in Li. This self-negativity is the reason why Li is always open to new creation and generation. It is necessary for Li to establish its own determination within itself, to generate and create specific things, and thus affirm itself in the existence and order of all things. Therefore, Li is the unity of negativity and positivity.
Key Words: Zhu Xi Li Hegel dialectics idea
导师：陈来教授
